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Foreword for Michael Harris,  
“A Right of Ethical Consideration for Non-Human 
Animals” 
 
Martha C. Nussbaum1 
 
It is an honor and a pleasure to introduce Michael Harris’s important 
article.  I have long admired Harris’s work as the Director of the Wildlife 
Division of Friends of Animals, where, as a creative and brilliant lawyer, 
he has done remarkable work, both as an advocate for animals in legal 
actions of many kinds, a few of which he mentions in this article, and also 
as an inspiring leader of an increasingly numerous and powerful legal team.  
Now, however, Harris articulates the bold theory that undergirds his legal 
practice.   
Harris is correct: our world is at a crossroads.  A new ethical 
consciousness is arising, gradually supplanting many centuries of 
obtuseness. No longer is it simply taken for granted that non-human 
animals are mere objects or property, to be used as humans please. 
Increasingly people feel ethical concern, not only for domesticated animals, 
but also for animals in the wild. And concern is not limited to pain and 
suffering: it extends, increasingly to the “capabilities” of animals for free 
movement, for relationships with creatures of their own kind, for pleasure 
and perception and play, in short for a form of life that is their own.  And 
yet law lags behind: animals have not yet been given standing in any legal 
proceeding, U.S. or international.    
Competing accounts of the best philosophical basis for animal 
entitlements are emerging. (I myself am writing a book to be called Justice 
for Animals: A New Theory of Animal Welfare, and to be published in 
2022 by Simon and Schuster, where I use my Capabilities Approach, to 
which Harris kindly refers, as the basis for my own preferred account.)  
Harris’s article proposes a bold first step that can be enthusiastically 
welcomed by my own theory and by others: namely, a right of ethical 
consideration, a right to have one’s good made the subject of a genuinely 
ethical deliberation.  Right now, deliberation about animals in law and 
politics is almost never ethical in the sense of being concerned ethically 
with the animals’ own good.  So simply getting the good of animals into 
the discussion, onto the table, is a step that would revolutionize all legal 
deliberations.  
 
1. Ernst Freund Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics, Law 
School and Philosophy Department, University of Chicago. 
 




Harris convincingly argues that a genuinely ethical deliberation 
should have three ingredients: philosophy, science, and law.  He shows why 
an interdisciplinary cooperation among all three disciplines is urgently 
needed, and he gives some illustrations of legal deliberations informed in 
the way he proposes.  Sometimes these legal proceedings became ethical 
more or less by chance.  In the example involving whales and the Navy’s 
sonar program, the Marine Mammal Protection Act was a rare case of a 
statute that asked judges to consider the welfare of individual animals, and 
not simply species survival.  The interpretation of the statute was ethical in 
a further way, taking account of the whales’ capabilities, not simply of pain 
and harm – probably because the judges concerned had an ethical 
awareness of whale lives that informed their deliberations.  In other cases, 
Harris’s own creative lawyering supplied the ethical dimension.  But our 
world should not depend on isolated or chance results in order to become 
more ethical.  We need an ethical consensus, here and now, that non-human 
animals are not mere property.  They are intelligent, sentient beings with a 
good of their own and a form of life of their own.   
There will be many difficult questions ahead, and many conflicts.  But 
if humanity can take the first step of committing to a genuinely ethical form 
of deliberation about the good of non-human animals, that is already a 




























A Right of Ethical Consideration for Non-Human 
Animals 
 
Michael Ray Harris2 
 
We must fight against the spirit of unconscious cruelty with 
which we treat the animals. Animals suffer as much as we do. True 
humanity does not allow us to impose such sufferings on them. It 
is our duty to make the whole world recognize it. Until we extend 






For millennia, humans have philosophized over the appropriate legal 
status and rights due to other species with whom we share this planet.3 
Given this lengthy discourse, it is not difficult to understand how many 
current scholars might conclude that while the idea of legal rights for 
animals remains “theoretically interesting,” it is “far removed” from 
practical reality.4 There is, however, an unmistakable difference in the 
conversation about animal rights today. It is no longer a discussion reserved 
for the scholarly. The question over legal rights for some, if not all, animals, 
has become a subject of intense public debate fueled by shared influences:5 
the expanding number of animal activist organizations;6 increased 
 
2. Director, Wildlife Law Program, Friends of Animals. Former Assistant Professor 
of Law, University of Denver Sturm College of Law (2008-2014). J.D., University of 
California at Berkeley (1995). M.S.L. Vermont Law School (1992). B.A. Pitzer College 
(1991). This paper is dedicated to the memory of Rachel Nussbaum Wichert. 
3. Ramona Ilea, From Pythagoras to Today: Animals and Philosophy 101, OUR HEN 
HOUSE (Feb. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/8Q6P-9USX; Joshua S. Sias, Ancient Animal Ethics: 
The Earliest Arguments for the Ethical Consideration of Nonhuman Animals, 2 THE 
DOWNTOWN REVIEW, Issue 1 at 1 (2016) (examining the status of animals ethics from the 
time of the ancient Greeks to modern times). 
4. Taimie L. Bryant, Symposium: Living on the Edge: The Margins of Legal 
Personhood: Sacrificing the Sacrifice of Animals: Legal Personhood for Animals, the Status 
of Animals as property, and the Presumed Primacy of Humans, 39 RUTGERS L. REV. 247, 
247 (2008). 
5. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Animals as more than “Mere Things,” But Still Property: 
A Call for Continuing Evolution of the Animal Welfare Paradigm, 84 U. CIN. L. REV. 1023, 
1025 (2016); Sias, supra note 3, at 1. 
6. For a discussion and list of animal rights organizations and activists, see Animal 
Rights Activists and Organizations, SPEAKING OF RESEARCH, https://perma.cc/DMB4-
2XDV (Ironically, my organization, Friends of Animals, founded in 1957 was one of the 
first groups to distinguish between animal welfare and rights, is not listed on this page.) 
 




awareness of the environmental and health benefits of a vegetarian or vegan 
diet;7 convincing evidence that many animals are sentient;8 mainstream 
media coverage of the lives of animals and human violence against them;9 
and a surge in litigation over the legal status of animals like elephants, 
chimpanzees, and whales.10 
This public attention is leading to tangible changes in how animals are 
perceived pragmatically, scientifically, and legally. Pragmatically, a 
significant (and increasing) number of people are expressing their 
indignation over the suffering animals endure at the hands of humans.11 In 
recent years, we have seen deep public backlash to the continued use of 
wild animals for entertainment,12 pets,13 and as hunting trophies.14 At the 
same time, while humans continue to consume millions of farm animals 
each year, there is a steady, appreciable decline in meat consumption in 
many countries, including the United States.15  
The scientific view of animals in our world is also greatly enlightened 
today. Just a few decades ago, scientists largely viewed non-human animals 
 
7. See e.g., James McWilliams, The Evidence for a Vegan Diet, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 
18, 2012), available at https://perma.cc/W7TY-BK6F. 
8. See infra at Part C. 
9. See infra notes 10-12. 
10. See Cupp, supra note 5, at 1025 n. 1.  
11. As recognized in a 2015 Gallup poll, today almost a third of Americans, 32%, 
believe animals should be given the same rights as people, while 62% say they deserve some 
protection but can still be used for the benefit of humans. Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S., More 
People Say Animals Should Have Same Rights As People, GALLUP (May 18, 2015), 
available at https://perma.cc/TZH3-4XSS; see also Cupp, supra note 5, at 1031–32. 
12. Probably the most well-known example is the so-called “Blackfish Effect”, 
involving public reaction to captivity of whales and other marine animals by SeaWorld and 
other entertainment-based aquariums after the release of the 2013 documentary Blackfish. 
See Mihir Zavari, SeaWorld Agrees to Pay $5 Million in ‘Blackfish Effect” Case, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 20, 2018, at B3.  Another example is the public outrage caused by the export 
of 18 wild elephants from Eswatini to 3 U.S. zoos in 2016.  See Tal Fox, American zoos fly 
18 elephants out of Swaziland despite protests by animal rights campaigners, INDEPENDENT 
(Mar. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/XQ5W-29E4; Charles Siebert, The Swazi 17, N.Y. TIMES 
MAGAZINE, July 14, 2019, at 26.  
13. See Erin Mulvaney, Bill would scratch big cats as pets, HOUSTON CHRONICLE 
(Mar. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/4KN4-5V4H; Should Exotic Animals be Kept as Pets?, 
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 4, 2009), https://perma.cc/8KNZ-XKN8. 
14. Jani Actman, Cecil the Lion Died Amid Controversy—Here’s What’s Happened 
Since, NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC (Oct. 15, 2018), https://perma.cc/HUN2-VGKZ (retelling the 
story of the killing of Cecil the lion by U.S. dentist Walter Palmer, an act “sparking an 
international outcry and greater scrutiny of trophy hunting for the heads, skins, or other body 
parts of wild animals”); Nick Allen, Texas big game hunter Corey Knowlton kills black 
rhino in Namibia, THE TELEGRAPH (May 20, 2015), https://perma.cc/C42A-6K72 (“The 
hunter who received death threats after bidding $350,000 (£225,000) at auction for the right 
to shoot the rare animal, killed it on camera.”). 
15. Report: Meat in Decline, WORLD PRESERVATION FOUNDATION, https://perma. 
cc/BF9H-6GFL. 
 




as mere “biological units” that required specific conditions—proper 
habitat, foods, temperature, etc.—to successfully reproduce and maintain a 
viable population.16  While some animals were proved more intelligent than 
others, science greatly ignored any evidence of sentience, such as self-
awareness, feelings, and emotions. While this type of scientific thinking 
continues to exist, it is far more usual for a scientist to now view animals 
as beings capable of living their own meaningful lives. This is exemplified 
in the pioneering work of Frans de Waal17 and the modern field of 
“Compassionate Conservationism.”18  
Legally, animals are still given very little protection from harassment 
or harm. There are very few examples of an animal being granted what we 
might consider to be a legal right,19 with no such cases at all in the United 
States.20 This is not to say, however, that judges, legislators, regulators, and 
other legal officials are immune from the changing perception of animals. 
Like in science, there is genuine evidence that the mindset toward animals 
in the law is softening. Through refined word selections and modest 
adjustments in status, recent legal proclamations about animals reflect 
acceptance of their sentience. For example, while we have long had laws 
that seek to prevent the physical infliction of pain on some domesticated 
animals,21 we have seen recent bold attempts to legally prevent emotional 
and psychological injury as well. This includes near outright bans on 
 
16. See infra Part D. 
17. See Mark Leviton, Not So Different After All: Frans de Wall On Animal 
Intelligence and Emotion, THE SUN, July 2020, 5–15. 
18. See MARC BEKOFF, REWILDING OUR HEARTS: BUILDING PATHWAYS OF 
COMPASSION AND COEXISTENCE 78–83 (New World Library, 2014). 
19.  A recent example is the 2019 decision by the High Court of Punjab and 
Haryanain in India.  In that case the court recognized under the Indian constitution all 
animals in the animal kingdom, including avian and aquatic species, as legal entities.  
Karnail Singh and Others v. State of Haryana, (2019) 533 CRR 2013 (Pun. & Har. HC) 
(India). 
20. See Cupp, infra note 5, at 1025–26. 
21. See infra Part I. B. 
 




capturing some animals—whales,22 chimpanzees,23 and most recently 
African elephants24—to force them into an undoubtedly miserable life of 
captivity.   
Given these encouraging developments, I would propose that an even 
loftier goal is imaginable: there will soon be a generation of animals 
roaming the Earth that represent the first of their species to have legal rights 
and safeguards. That is, genuine laws preventing their mental, emotional, 
social, and physical suffering at the hands of humans. This may not come 
simultaneously for all animals, but it is certainly a vision for some species 
that is no longer merely theoretical.  
Now, I know what you are thinking. Humankind is simply incapable 
of such a grand gesture to another species.  Indeed, we have yet to extend 
such a system of rights and safeguards equally among the members of our 
own species.  Yes, humans can be terrible, and at any point in time there is 
ample evidence of this fact.  There is also, however, a great deal of kindness 
in us.25  Overall, our collective history has been one of working toward 
(albeit in fits and starts) a system for ethical consideration for the well-
being of other humans.  And we are starting to see such considerations 
extend to other animals.  
What is needed, however, is an accelerant.  An approach to animal 
rights that will both bind and escalate the pragmatic, scientific, and legal 
advancements experienced recently. There are many bidders for this honor.  
The idea that animals feel pain and can suffer has long been considered an 
 
22. In 2005, Costa Rica became the first country to ban cetacean captivity. Decree 
Prohibits Capture of Whales and Dolphins, THE TICO TIMES (Aug. 26, 2005), https://perma. 
cc/DV9M-BTBQ. California state imposed a similar ban in 2016. Protection of orcas: 
unlawful activity, Cal. Legis. 2305 (2015-2016), https://perma.cc/4Z6A-GB88; Canada has 
also banned cetaceans from being bred or kept in captivity.  Amy Held, Canada Bans 
Keeping Whales and Dolphins in Captivity, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, (June 11, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/4P6T-S4ZD. 
23. In 2015, U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service listed all chimpanzees as endangered, 
wherever found. Previously, FWS had separately classified captive and wild chimpanzees, 
with the former not receiving the status of endangered. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 50 C.F.R. 
§17.40 (2015), https://perma.cc/YR86-AFLF. Likewise, all African countries where 
chimpanzees reside have laws in place to prevent capture and trade.  Jason Goldman 
Chimpanzees Should Not Be Used in TV or Movies SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN: THE THOUGHTFUL 
ANIMAL (Oct. 12, 2011), https://perma.cc/883E-4JLG. Chimpanzees are awarded the 
highest level of protection under the Convention on International Trade in Endangered 
Species (CITES) and can only be exported from West Africa under narrow exceptions. 
David Shukman & Sam Piranty, The secret trade in baby chimps, BBC NEWS (Jan. 30, 
2017), https://perma.cc/F8P7-Q42J. 
24. The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES) recently 
instituted a ban on taking baby African elephants from the wild and selling them to zoos. 
Zoo trade in baby elephant banned internationally, BBC NEWS (Aug. 27, 2019), https:// 
perma.cc/Q7EU-VV4H. 
25. See Eoin O’Carroll, Why Are Humans So Kind, Yet So Cruel?, THE CHRISTIAN 
SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 6, 2019), https://perma.cc/K3C4-JKLF. 
 




instrument for promoting their legal rights.26  The high levels of intelligence 
that some non-human animals possess is yet another vehicle offered by 
some theorists.27  More recently, arguments for legal personhood status 
have been promoted based on evidence that some animals possess a high 
sense of autonomy and self-awareness.28  All of these theories have been 
extensively critiqued by scholars and practitioners, and no doubt all have 
merits and flaws.   
In this article, I propose an approach to animal rights that centers on 
the idea of a right of ethical consideration.  While this right is a legal one, 
it is designed to draw upon the advancements of our scientific knowledge 
of the emotional responses and social behaviors of other species.  It is not 
intended to require specific changes in human behavior toward animals (at 
least not directly), but instead to fuel our practical understanding of the 
meaningful lives of other animals.  Simply put, we must develop a legal 
system that obligates a more careful consideration of how our actions, 
however beneficial to our species, may produce harm in the day-to-day 
lives of other non-human animals.  
Currently, the law only seeks to minimize the physical suffering or 
death of an animal, or loss of an animal’s habitat, when sanctioning human 
activity.29  Increasingly, however, we understand that our impact on 
animals can include psychological and emotional harm.  As Martha C. 
Nussbaum would explain it, our current legal system fails to respect 
species-specific, basic capabilities, whether bodily integrity, play, 
sense/imagination/thought, emotion, practical reason, affiliation, or some 
other capability unique to that animal.30 
A right of ethical consideration as envisioned here is a legal obligation 
on our governmental decision-makers (and perhaps corporations) to fully 
examine how human actions degrade the types of lives animals are trying 
to lead.  Such a right is not based solely on our compassion or empathy for 
an animal, but on moral and scientific principles that we can justify by 
argument.  Our decision-making processes must embrace our ever-
expanding knowledge of how human involvement or interference with an 
animal diminishes one or more of that animal’s basic capabilities.  In other 
words, the reason to focus on the ethical treatment of animals is because of 
them, not because of us.  What we feel is neither here nor there. What 
matters is the impact we have on an animal’s life—whether causing 
physical, mental or emotional pain, or depriving that animal from 
 
26. See infra Part II B (1). 
27. See infra Part II. B (2). 
28. See infra Part II. B (2). 
29. See infra Part I. B. 
30. Martha C. Nussbaum, Working with and for Animals: Getting the Theoretical 
Framework Right with a Foreword By Michael Harris, 94 DENVER L. REV. 605, 621–23 
(2017). 
 




connections and opportunities to live a better life.  Whether we feel 
compassion or not, we are morally obligated to prevent these impacts. 
Finally, the right of ethical consideration I seek is not the granting of 
specific substantive rights for animals, like the right to life, freedom, etc.  
It is, however, a pathway to strengthening legal protections for animals and 
future substantive, but appropriate, rights.  By requiring decision-makers 
and the public to engage in active deliberation about the human impact on 
an animal’s ability to live a meaningful life, societal and legal beliefs 
regarding the rights of non-human animals can more quickly change for the 
better. 
Part I of this paper will examine the current status of animals in our 
legal system. Not surprisingly, these protections are thin.  Most captive 
animals are considered to be a form of property, while wild animals are free 
only until their lawful capture (or death).  Existing laws protect only a small 
number of animals from acts of human cruelty toward them.  Part II will 
look at the early foundation of the animal rights movement, primarily 
through the work of the philosophers.  Part II will also consider some of the 
modern legal theories for animal rights, including the notion of personhood.  
A good deal of attention is provided to the capabilities approach, which I 
consider to be an essential component of a right of ethical consideration.  
Part III will present the fundamentals of a right of ethical consideration.  It 
is argued that such a right is built upon three tiers: philosophical conviction, 
scientific imagination, and legal ingenuity.  Finally, Part IV will consider 
how a proposed right to consideration might stand up to the critique given 
to other proposals for animal rights.  I argue that the primary advantage a 
right of ethical consideration has over other proposals, like personhood, is 
that it does not invoke utilitarian arguments tying rights to individual 
service to society.  An animal is not entitled to ethical consideration 
because it performs the rights and duties of personhood, but instead because 
he or she has the ability function within her specific set of capabilities, and 
to otherwise live a life of meaning. 
 
I. The Standing of Animals in the Law 
 
A. Animals as Property 
 
Any discussion regarding the standing of animals in the law must start 
with the concept of property.  Owned animals—those actually in the 
possession of individuals, institutions, and corporations—are almost 
universally considered to be a form of vested personal property.31  This 
designation would apply to an individually owned pet, as well as to the 
 
31. Gary L. Francione, Animals as Property, 2 ANIMAL L. i, ii (1996). 
 




billions of animals used in the agricultural, entertainment, research, and 
captive hunting industries.32 
The more problematic property interest is that in wild animals.  As the 
Supreme Court recognized at the end of the nineteenth century in Geer v. 
Connecticut, “[a] man may lastly have a qualified property in [wild] 
animals feroe nature, propter privilegium, that is, he may have the privilege 
of hunting, taking, and killing them in exclusion of other persons.”33  As 
Justice Field describes this property interest in his dissent: 
 
The wild bird in the air belongs to no one, but when the 
fowler brings it to the earth and takes it into his possession it is his 
property.  He has reduced it to his control by his own labor, and 
the law of nature and the law of society recognize his exclusive 
right to it.  The pearl at the bottom of the sea belongs to no one, 
but the diver who enters the water and brings it to light has 
property in the gem.  He has by his own labor reduced it to 
possession, and in all communities and by all law his right to it is 
recognized.  So, the trapper on the plains and the hunter in the 
north have a property in the furs they have gathered, though the 
animals from which they were taken roamed at large and belonged 
to no one.  They have added by their labor to the uses of man an 
article promoting his comfort which, without that labor, would 
have been lost to him.  They have a right, therefore, to the furs, 
and every court in Christendom would maintain it.34  
 
The truth is, since Justinian times there has really been no serious legal 
dispute that wild animals can be the property of individuals.35  Instead, what 
was disputed is the extent to which a sovereign—the king or prince—may 
hold original and perhaps superior title in them even before capture.  Thus, 
in some early “civilized” countries, a sovereign had the right to reserve wild 
animals to himself and proscribe who had the right to hunt or capture wild 
animals, as well as where such capture would be allowed.36 Geer itself is a 
 
32. See generally, Karen Bradshaw, Animal Property Rights, 89 COLO. L. REV. 809, 
818 (2018). 
33. Geer v. State of Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 526-27 (1896) (quoting 2 Bl. Com. 
394). 
34. Id. at 540 (Field, J., dissenting). 
35. See id. at 523 (quoting INSTITUTES OF JUSTINIAN, Book 2, Tit. 1, s. 12). 
36. See id. at 524 (quoting Pothier, TRAITE DU DROIT DE PROPREIETE, Nos. 27-28); 
id. at 523 (noting that under the “ancient law of the continent of Europe . . . the right to 
acquire animals feroe nature by possession was recognized as being subject to government 
authority and under its power, not only as a matter of regulation, but also of absolute 
control”). 
 




remnant of the debate of the sovereign’s superior claim in title to wild 
animals in its jurisdiction.37 
Today, “[a] State does not stand in the same position as the owner of 
a private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of ‘owning’ wild fish, 
birds, or animals.”38  The “‘ownership language of cases like Geer are now 
understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction expressing ‘the 
importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate 
the exploitation of an important resource.’”39  Of course, a wild animal 
living today is free only to the extent that he or she has yet to be subdued, 
captured or killed by a human being under whatever regulatory scheme 
enacted by the state in which the animal finds herself at the time.40  Thus, 
even under this modern analysis, wild animals remain transient property.41  
 
B. Legal Structures to Punish Cruel and In-Humane Treatment of 
Animals 
 
While animals are considered property—whether vested or 
transient—they are not treated by our legal system the same as other forms 
of personal property.  Most of us are free to use and treat our appliances, 
computers, and even cars in any destructive manner we see fit (except of 
course to the peril of others).  With animals we have managed to create a 
legal (and moral) fiction that seeks to balance our ownership interest in 
them with our knowledge that our actions can cause them inordinate pain 
 
37. Geer addressed the constitutionality of a Connecticut statute that prohibited the 
taking of certain bird species for the purpose of transporting them outside of the state.  Id. 
at 521.  In essence, that state had asserted its control over these wild animals to condition 
any subsequent property right that one might acquire from capturing or killing these birds.  
Such interest prohibited one from causing the animal or its carcass from entering the stream 
of interstate commerce.  Id. at 530–31.  Geer, which asserts a doctrine very close to the 
absolute control over wild animals asserted by older European states, was overruled nearly 
80 years later in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979). 
38. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 334–35 (1979) (quoting Geer v. Connecticut, 161 
U.S. 539-40 (Field, J., dissenting)). 
39. Id. at 335 (citations omitted).  A number of states, however, continue to codify 
the notion of absolute ownership in their laws.  See, e.g., Hollywood Park Humane Soc’y v. 
Town of Hollywood Park, No. SA-03-CA-1312-XR, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 783, at *11 
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 23, 2004) (affirming a Texas statute that states, “all wild animals, fur-
bearing animals, wild birds and wild fowl inside the borders of this state are the property of 
the people of this state”). 
40. See U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service, State Hunting Licenses (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://perma.cc/7XAS-37YL. 
41. Geer, 161 U.S. 519 at 527 (citations omitted) (The possessor “has a transient 
property in these animals . . . so long as they continue within his liberty, and may restrain 
any stranger from taking them therein; but the instant they depart into another liberty, this 
qualified property ceases.”). 
 




and suffering.  Professor Gary L. Francione has described this “moral 
schizophrenia” about nonhuman animals this way: 
 
Social attitudes about animals are hopelessly confused.  On one 
hand, many people regard at least some nonhumans—their “pets” 
—as members of their families.  On the other hand, these very same 
people think nothing about eating animals other than “pets,” wearing 
their skins, using them in experiments, or exploiting them for 
entertainment in films, circuses, zoos, and rodeos.  On one hand, we 
all agree with the notion that it is morally wrong to inflict 
“unnecessary” pain and suffering on nonhumans; on the other hand, 
we routinely use animals in all sorts of contexts that could never be 
considered as involving any coherent notion of necessity.42  
 
This confusion has led us to enact a slew of animal welfare laws 
designed to essentially categorize non-human animal cruelty into the 
necessary (which is not prohibited) and the unnecessary (which is made 
subject to some legal penalty).43  Thus, while today each of the fifty states 
has an anti-cruelty law on the books,44 these laws protect only a small 
number of animals and fail to constrain to any meaningful extent the overall 
infliction of horrific suffering on animals.45  Only purposeful suffering of 
specifically enumerated animals is banned.46  Kicking or intentionally 
injuring a dog or house cat may be a crime, but the trapping, poisoning and 
killing of mice, rats, raccoons, prairie dogs, and other animals is widely 
accepted (and sometimes encouraged).47  Other animals, typically referred 
to as game, are protected only to the form and timing of their killing.48  And 
 
42. Francione, supra note 31, at ii. 
43. See id.  Citing Chief Justice Coleridge, Professor Francione puts it this way: “any 
procedure ‘without which an animal cannot attain its full development or be fitted for its 
ordinary use may fairly come within the term ‘necessary.’”  Not ”every treatment of an 
animal which inflicts pain, even great pain of mutilation, and which is cruel in the ordinary 
sense of the word is necessarily” cruelty proscribed by law, which is only that pain inflicted 
for ”only for pain inflicted for no legitimate purpose.”  Id. (citations omitted). 
44. Cupp, supra note 5, at 1032–33. 
45. See Bryant, supra note 4, at 248. 
46. Francione, supra note 31, at ii. 
47. See, e.g., Taimie Bryant, Animals Modified: Defining Animals/Defining Human 
Obligations to Animals, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 137, 151 (2006) (“Just as a rat is not an animal 
when the law says she isn’t and is an animal when she says she is, a chicken is not legally 
an animal unless a specific law defines chickens as animals.”). 
48. This is typically done through individual state hunting, fishing and trapping laws.  
 




very few state laws regulate pain and suffering inflicted on the billions of 
farm animals each year.49 
Federal law is no better. Three laws primarily regulate the welfare of 
captive animals.  First, the federal Humane Methods of Slaughter Act 
(“HMSA”),50 passed in 1958, requires that some animals be stunned into 
unconsciousness before slaughter, to minimize pain.51  Not all animals that 
we know feel pain are covered, however.  Chickens, turkeys and other 
birds, for instance, are exempt.  Indeed, according to one estimate, the law 
applies to “only about five percent of the close to 10 billion animals 
slaughtered each year for food.”52 
Second, is the Animal Welfare Act (“AWA”),53 enacted more than 50 
years ago.  As an initial critique, and perhaps because of the HMSA, the 
AWA excludes from its coverage all animals raised for food.54  Even more 
striking, the AWA also excludes 90% of animals used in research.55  As to 
the estimated 250 species of animals that are covered, the law basically 
deals only with their transportation and husbandry requirements.56  Perhaps 
distilled to its essence, the AWA is nothing more than a set of minimum 
standards for food and habitat requirements. 
Still, over the course of its existence the AWA has routinely been 
hailed as a “landmark” animal protection act.57  A more recent (and 
accurate) critique of the AWA, however, exposes the law for what it really 
is, “ineffective [and] worse, counterproductive.”58  As Professor Justin 
Marceau explains it: 
The AWA simplifies and entrenches the particular America 
schizophrenia about animals—we love some like family, and treat 
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many others like undifferentiated biomass that is well-suited for 
food, entertainment, breeding, experimentation, and other uses 
that bring us pleasure or perceived benefits.  In this way, the AWA 
is the ultimate wolf in sheep’s clothing.  It has legitimized a vast 
system of animal mistreatment, both through its exemptions and 
the way it is applied, and it has facilitated the hijacking of the 
concept “welfare” by the industries and researchers that are 
regulated by the AWA.59  
 
Third, is the recently enacted Preventing Animal Cruelty and Torture 
Act (“PACT”).60  Signed into law in 2019, PACT strengthens many state 
animal welfare laws by making some of the most egregious forms of animal 
cruelty—specifically crushing, burning, drowning, suffocating, impaling or 
sexual exploitation—in or affecting interstate commerce or within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States a federal crime.61  While PACT 
answers the long-time call of animal advocates for broader federal 
protection for animals,62 it also includes many of the same exceptions from 
the AWA for “customary and normal” agricultural and veterinary 
practices.63 
As for wild animals, as noted above, modern laws at both the federal 
and state level are largely designed to regulate the taking of so-called game 
animals.  Other laws, like the federal Endangered Species Act64 and the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act,65 seek to regulate human “take” of certain 
species to prevent their extinction.66  In all, however, the laws that pertain 
to wild animals are generally not focused on animal welfare, and are 
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designed to reduce pain and suffering only to the extent they codify what 
some claim to be “humane hunting practices.”67  
 
II. Foundations of the Animal Rights Movement 
 
A.  Early Foundations 
 
Kinship between humans and other animals in the natural world has 
been a topic of philosophical discussion since ancient times.  While 
scholars think that Pythagoras is a figure of legend about whom nothing 
solid is known,68 some see him among the earliest of advocates that non-
human animals possess intelligence, rationality, and passion.69  These are 
considered the elements of life that allow for sentience and that make the 
mistreatment of non-human animals unethical.70  As one scholar observed: 
“[f]or Pythagoras man was intimately linked with the rest of the animal 
kingdom and did not enjoy innate superiority over the other animals.  Man 
was not the image of the divine, but a living being whose only 
distinguishing characteristic was his greater ability to be trained and 
participate in intelligence.”71   
It is possible that these observations come from the later phase of his 
school, and not directly from his writings.  Even so, it is at least likely that 
some of the earliest views about the kinship of species can be attributed to 
Pythagoras.72 
Aristotle’s thoughts on non-human animals are open to question by 
some, but are often considered aligned with modern animal rights 
advocacy.  Rachel Nussbaum Wichert and Professor Martha C. Nussbaum 
have described Aristotle as making “keen observations of animals” that 
“led him to recognize many types of commonality between humans and 
animals with respect to goal-directed practical reasoning and cognitively 
rich emotions.”73  However, he did not say much about them ethically, and 
 
67. See, e.g., Miles Olsen, Proper Shot Placement for Humane Hunting, MOTHER 
EARTH NEWS (Feb. 2016), https://perma.cc/G3F4-SXU2. 
68. Personal communication with Martha C. Nussbaum (Mar. 5, 2020) (on file with 
author). 
69. Sias, supra note 3, at 5. 
70. Id. 
71. PETER GORMAN, PYTHAGORAS: A LIFE 185 (Routledge 1979). 
72. See WALTER BURKERT, LORE AND SCIENCE IN ANCIENT PYTHAGOREANISM 
(Edwin L. Minar, Jr., 1972). 
73. RACHEL NUSSBAUM WICHERT & MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, The Legal Status of 
Whales and Dolphins: From Bentham to the Capabilities Approach, AGENCY AND 
DEMOCRACY IN DEVELOPMENT ETHICS 259, 271 (L. Keleher & S. Kosko eds., 2019) 
(discussing Aristole’s “keen observations” on animals’ “practical reasoning and cognitively 
rich emotions”). 
 




on occasion argued for human domain over other animals, as had 
Socrates.74 As he explained in his Politics: 
 
plants are for the sake of animals, and that the other animals 
are for the sake of human beings, domestic ones both for using and 
eating, and most but not all wild ones for food and other kinds of 
support, so that clothes and other tools may be got from them.  If 
then nature makes nothing incomplete or pointless, it must have 
made them for the sake of human beings.75 
 
For Professor Nussbaum, the low standing of other animals in the 
natural order and the lack of any ethical discourse by Aristotle is certainly 
odd given his making such “keen observations” of animal reasoning and 
emotions, but the two are not necessarily a contradiction.  She rebuts, as 
observed by one of her dissertation students, that “his criticisms of human 
greed would at least lead in the direction of less-meat eating and other 
abuses of animals.”76 
Porphyry, a late Platonist wrote On Abstaining from Animal Flesh, 
which still exists and has insightful things to say about the view of animals 
in his day.  This work is addressed to a friend and former vegetarian who 
has resumed the consumption of meat.77  The work shows that Porphyry’s 
abstinence from eating animals is motivated by the goal “of freeing oneself 
from the body and the sensible realm as much as possible.”78  However, his 
ethical concerns over eating animals is set forth as well.  Porphyry accords 
rationality to the animals and emphasizes what they have in common with 
humans.79  He claims that it is plainly unjust to harm those who intend no 
harm against us, and applies this standard to the animals.80  So his 
vegetarianism is also a matter of justice and kinship. 
Finally, animal ethics has been addressed by other historical thinkers 
beginning with Descartes, who argued that animals, while at times acting 
in sophisticated ways, could not feel pain and suffer.81  This assertion was 
challenged by others that followed him, including Percy Shelly, Voltaire, 
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Gandhi, and Tolstoy. Each argued that 
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animals do suffer and feel pain and deserve to be treated well.82  Immanuel 
Kant took a more middle-ground view on the moral status of non-human 
animals. He argued while they do not have inherent value, hurting them 
hurts humanity, and being kind to them benefits humanity.83 
All of this historical reasoning has led over time to three modern 
arguments to extending legal protections from mere welfare measures to 
some form of equitable rights akin to those that many humans have today.  
These arguments include: (1) the rationale of suffering; (2) the rationale of 
autonomy; and (3) application of capabilities approach. We will look at 
each of these briefly before moving into their application to a right of 
ethical consideration for all animals. 
 
B. Modern Foundations. 
 
1. The Rationale of Suffering. 
 
With respect to theoretical arguments for animal rights, the rationale 
of suffering, pioneered by the utilitarian Jeremy Bentham, has led the 
way.84  Bentham “famously” held that the only salient ethical facts for us 
to understand are the presence of pleasure and pain.85  Accordingly, ethics 
is “the art of directing man’s actions to the production of the greatest 
possible quantity of happiness, on part of those whose interest is in view.”86  
Importantly, Bentham did not feel constrained by the “conventional Judeo-
Christian views” of his time regarding animals.87  Instead, he recognized 
that humans can direct their own actions or others, including “animals, 
which on their own account of their interests having been neglected by the 
insensibility of the ancient jurists, stand degraded into the class of things.”88  
Bentham’s interest in reducing suffering and increasing pleasure, and not 
on some notion of intelligence or reasoning, was clearly the basis for his 
advocacy for animals.  As he described it, “the question is not, [c]an they 
reason? Nor, can they talk? but, [c]an they suffer?”89 
We now believe that Bentham’s animal advocacy was not a mere part 
of his larger repudiation of British attitudes that underlay Victorian views 
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of the human-animal divide.  Instead, it appears to be a genuine interest in 
animals, and their suffering.  As Rachel Nussbaum-Wichert and Martha C. 
Nussbaum explain: 
But the interest of animals was very genuine: numerous remarks of 
Bentham himself and his devoted editor John Bowring testified to his 
fondness for wide range of animals, including cats, donkeys, pigs, and 
mice. He cultivated a friendship with a pig who used to follow him around 
on walks.  A cat he named Reverend John Langborn used to eat macaroni 
at the table with him.  He loved to have mice play in his study and eat 
crumbs from his lap.  “I love everything that has four legs,” he wrote.  He 
used to call with dismay the cruelties that he himself had inflicted on 
animals as a child, and the salutary effect that his uncle’s reproaches had 
on him.90 
While Bentham’s views would not be considered radical today—
while he rejected hunting and fishing for sport, he did not oppose the ethical 
eating of animals91—it was certainly radical for his day.  As Gary 
Francione explains, “Bentham’s position marked a sharp departure from a 
cultural tradition that had never before regarded animals as other than 
things to avoid morally significant interests . . . For Bentham, our treatment 
of animals matters because of its effect on beings that can suffer, and our 
duties are owed directly to them.”92  Most importantly, Bentham’s work 
inspired many early animal welfare acts,93 and continues to be the basis for 
many modern arguments for animal rights and elimination of the animals 
as property paradigm.94  
 
2. The Rationale of Intelligence. 
 
John Stuart Mill, seeking to expand upon Bentham’s focus on 
hedonism, provided, albeit unintendedly, a new rationale for the granting 
of rights to non-human animals—intelligence.  Mill believed that 
Bentham’s focus on pleasure was too simplistic.  Mill believed that 
pleasures differ in quality as well as quantity and believed that mental 
pleasures were superior to pleasures of the body.95  Mill did not appear to 
have the same affection for animals, however.  He generally believed that 
animals lacked the capacity to experience the “higher” mental pleasures, 
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which were reserved (in line with the Victorian views of his time) for 
humans.96   
Mill ignores, however, the views of possibly Pythagoras and certainly 
Aristotle that animals of many types exhibit intelligence and cognitive 
capacity.  Even if we attribute his view to a legitimate disagreement on the 
issue, he is certainly refuted by modern science.  As Rachel Nussbaum-
Wichert and Martha Nussbuam have observed, “a flood of new research on 
the cognitive capacities of animals has made Aristotle’s insights impossible 
to deny.”97  Just to mention the more well-known cases today, it is widely 
known that the great apes, whales, and dolphins (among others) 
demonstrate extremely high intelligence.98  These animals exhibit 
“resourceful goal-directed behaviors,” forms of language, and “complex 
forms of socially learned interactions amounting to culture.”99 
Today, the rationale of intelligence is at the heart of a legal strategy, 
closely associated with attorney Steven A. Wise, to emancipate captive 
animals like chimpanzees and elephants in the United States.100  In both his 
2001 book, Rattling the Case: Toward Legal Rights for Animals,101 and in 
a 2016 documentary film about his work,102 Wise argues that certain 
animals possess such similarities to human beings that negate any basis for 
treating them differently than humans in the eyes of the law.  As Martha C. 
Nussbaum describes his work: 
 
They are, he says, self-conscious, they are self-directing, they 
have a theory of mind, they have culture, they are not ‘cabined by 
instinct,’ they are able to contemplate their own future.  In general, 
they are ‘really, really smart.’  Centrally, he holds that they are 
‘autonomous creatures’ who, for that reason, should have 
‘autonomous lives.’103 
 
In making these observations, Wise intends to show us that the line 
we have drawn between humans and non-human animals is “irrational and 
needs rethinking.”104  He does this through a series of well-thought-out 
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pieces of visual evidence that at their core other species can undertake 
human-like activities, from using language to showing emotions.105  In this 
sense, his work is designed to play off of our own desire to see human 
attributes in certain non-human animals.  
Wise’s work has been very important in the field of legal rights for 
non-human animals, and certainly represents the forefront of the 
“personhood” movement for some animal species.106  At the core of the 
personhood movement is the belief that since the law gives 
legal personhood to corporations, municipalities, and ships, it is immoral to 
deprive the same liberty rights to certain animals.107  As Judge Fahey of the 
New York Court of Appeals puts it: 
 
Does an intelligent nonhuman animal who thinks and plans 
and appreciates life as human beings do have the right to the 
protection of the law against arbitrary cruelties and enforced 
detentions visited on him or her?  This is not merely a definitional 
question, but the deep dilemma of the ethics and policy that 
demands our attention.  To treat a chimpanzee as if he or she had 
no right to liberty protected by habeas corpus is to regard the 
chimpanzee as entirely lacking independent worth, as a mere 
resource for human use, a thing the value of which consists 
exclusively in its usefulness to others.  Instead, we should 
consider whether a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent 
value who has the right to be treated with respect.108 
 
Unfortunately, it can be said that Wise’s work has often over-
accentuated autonomy as the foundation for non-human legal rights.109  
This has left him vulnerable to other aspects of granting legal status to non-
human rights that need to be answered.  For example, he has failed to 
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account for more utilitarian arguments for defining personhood.  While a 
court might be willing to accept and appreciate that a chimpanzee, for 
instance, is self-aware and intelligent, the legal retort is that such an animal 
is still not a person because it lacks the “capacity or ability . . . to bear legal 
duties, or be held legally accountable for [its] actions.”110  Thus, the 
argument goes, a corporation can be counted on to pay taxes and follow the 
law, thus making it worthy of the privileges personhood bestows on it under 
our legal system.  
Similarly, Wise’s arguments don’t provide an adequate explanation 
regarding what remedy should be available for an emancipated animal.  
While he has made a compelling argument that some non-human animals 
deserve more control over their lives, he has also argued that chimpanzees 
are at the level of a 5-year old human child.111  And while no one would 
argue that a 5-year old should not have some right of self-control, we 
certainly would not set the child free.  Instead, his position suggests he is 
not arguing for actual legal rights, but instead for a new system of welfare 
restrictions imposed on the animal’s guardian.  
Finally, he has not adequately explained how his legal theory sets a 
usable precedent for considering similar legal claims by other animals in 
the future.  On one hand, he acknowledges his work is “the first salvo” in a 
strategic war.112  This strongly suggests he sees his cases as a first step 
toward establishing rights for a broader range of species.113  On the other 
hand, his focus on autonomy seems to validate the old idea of a scala 
naturae with us at the top.  In other words, after our dominance, some 
animals might get more legal protections because they are like us; others, 
perhaps less intelligent, will not.  Martha C. Nussbaum has argued that such 
thinking is not “just intellectually lazy and complacent,” but also 
potentially “dangerous.”114  Among other things, she notes it leads us to 
focus on “artificial performances” that may not be characteristic of the life 
a species actually lives in the wild.115  Thus, she has recently worked to 
apply her version of the Capabilities Approach to animals, arguing it is 
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3. The Capabilities Approach 
 
The Capabilities Approach was developed with only the human case 
in mind. According to the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: 
 
The capability approach is a theoretical framework that entails 
two core normative claims: first, the claim that the freedom to 
achieve well-being is of primary moral importance, and second, that 
freedom to achieve well-being is to be understood in terms of 
people’s capabilities, that is, their real opportunities to do and be 
what they have reason to value.  The approach has been developed 
in a variety of more specific normative theories, such as (partial) 
theories of social justice or accounts of development ethics.116 
 
The Capabilities Approach argues that in looking at how well a group 
of humans is doing the focus should not be on average utility.117  Rather, 
the right question to ask is, ‘How well are the individuals able to do and be 
in areas important to their lives?’118  The answer to that question is the 
account of that individual’s capabilities.119 
Martha C. Nussbaum has developed a version of the Capabilities 
Approach that creates a partial approach to basic social justice and human 
rights.120  She has developed a list of ten capabilities that she argues must 
be secured up to a minimum level for individuals within the group for that 
group to have any claim to justice: Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; 
Senses, Imagination and Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; 
Connection to Other Species; Play; and Control Over One’s 
Environment.121 
Turning to animals, Nussbaum has argued that dignity is not just a 
human right but belongs to other animals as well.  In her view, “all are 
worthy of lives commensurate with the many types of dignity inherent in 
their own forms of life.  All animals, in short, should have a shot at 
flourishing in their own way.”122  Most importantly, and what sets her 
approach apart from others, she recognizes that:  
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“[each] creature [ ] deserves ethical consideration for what it 
is, and a kind of constitution that specifies what harms it should not 
be permitted to suffer—not in terms of its likeness to humans or its 
possession of some least-common-denominator property—but in 
terms of what it is itself, the form of life it leads.”123  
 
In other words, capabilities are species-specific.  
In this regard, while recognizing that even some of the ten “human” 
basic capabilities she has identified might apply to some non-human 
species,124 she advocates for similar lists of capabilities for other animals.  
While not providing such lists, she does provide us with a number of 
questions to consider: 
 
What life span is normal for that species in the wild?  What is 
the physical condition of the healthy animal?  What human [or non-
human] acts invade or impair the bodily integrity of that sort of 
animal?  What types of movement from place to place are normal 
and more pleasurable for that sort of animal?  What sensory and 
imaginative stimulation does this animal seek, and what is it to keep 
the animal in an unacceptably deficient sensory environment?  
What is it for this sort of animal to live in a crippling and intolerable 
fear or depression, or with a lack of bonds of concern?  What type 
of affiliations does this animal seek in the wild, what sorts of 
groups, both reproductive and social, does it form?  What types of 
communication does the animal engage in, using what sensory 
modalities?  What is it for the animal to be humiliated and 
disrespected? What is it for the animal to play and enjoy itself?  
Does the animal have meaningful relationships with other species 
and the world of nature?  What type of objects does the animal use 
and need to control if it is to live its life?125 
 
Nussbaum does not purport to answer these questions for each species, 
or to determine how species-specific capabilities should be addressed by 
the law.126  These are questions that beg for a system that can be applied by 
compassionate conservationists and animal rights advocates in the future.  
A system like the right of ethical consideration, to which I now turn. 
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III. A Right of Ethical Consideration for All Animals “All Life Is 
Holy:”127 The Need for Humans to Re-Communion with other Sentient 
Creatures. 
 
According to Nalungiaq, a Netsilik Inuit, “[i]n the very earliest time, 
when both people and animals lived on earth, a person could become an 
animal if he wanted to and an animal could become a human being. 
Sometimes they were people, and sometimes animals and there was no 
difference. All spoke the same language.”128  This passage should serve to 
remind us of that intuitive feeling that there is a profound connection 
between the human mind and the natural world.  Indeed, we share DNA 
with every creature that ever walked, crawled, flew, or swam on the 
Earth.129  Building in complexity over billions of years, human DNA today 
not only contains our species and individual traits, but also the seed for the 
intuitive senses that all life needs to survive.130  For humans, and likely for 
many other species on the planet, when properly nurtured, these senses 
appear designed to favor, among other things, “living in peace with [the] 
world,” not as masters over other living things, but as guests among 
others.131  As the late Professor Paul Shepard explains:  
 
For the infant as person to be, the shape of all otherness grows 
out of that maternal relationship. Yet the setting of that 
relationship was, in the evolution of humankind, a surround of 
living plants, rich in texture, smell, and motion, the unfiltered, 
unpolluted air, the flicker of wild birds, real sunshine and rain, 
mud to be tasted and tree bark to grasp, the sounds of winds and 
water, the voices of animals and insects and humans—all of these 
are not vague and pleasant amenities for the infant, but the stuff 
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Some indigenous cultures, and more holistic religions, like Buddhism 
and Hinduism, have retained these beliefs and way of life.133  Elsewhere, 
particularly in what is called the West, so-called civilized cultures have 
largely abandoned the “ceremonies” of infant nurturing aimed at affirming 
“the metaphoric, mysterious, and poetic qualities of nature” already fixed 
in our body and mind through evolution.134 
An early, yet often unexamined acknowledgement of the dissolution 
of human union with nature and other animals is found in the intricate 
writings of Alain de Lille (or Alan of Lille), a French theologian and poet 
born near the end of the dark ages.135  One scholar who has dissected these 
writings, Wendell Berry, recounts Alan’s telling of his dream-vision 
conversing with Nature, whom he recognizes both as his “kinswoman” and 
as the Vicar of God.136  In his interpretation of Alan’s work (De planctu 
Naturae (On the Plaint of Nature), Berry states that through his vision, Alan 
is told by Nature (his “great instructor”) that: the integrity of the natural 
world depends on the maintenance by humans of their integrity by practice 
of the virtues.  The integrities are interdependent.  They cannot be separated 
and they must not be separately thought about.137  
Berry notes that these virtues—which were defined by Alan to include 
the practice of chastity, temperance, generosity, and humility138—are 
certainly high standards that have not been met by the humans of the 
industrial age.139  But perhaps more importantly, it appears that the point of 
Alan’s “vision” is that they were already not being properly practiced by 
humans in his time, with a very grave outcome for the relationship between 
humans and the non-human world, including other animals.  According to 
Berry, in Alan’s mind, our abstention from the virtues severed our intuitive 
link with Nature.  As he puts it: 
 
Intuition tells us, and has told maybe as long as we have been 
human, that the nature of the world is a great being, the one being 
used in which all other beings, living and not living our joy.  And 
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for his longest time, in our tradition, we have called this being 
“Natura,” or “Kind” or “Nature.”  And if we forget, our language 
remembers for us the relation of “natural” (by the way of “kind”) to 
“kindness” and “kin,” and to “natal,” “native,” nativity,” and 
“nation.”  Moreover, as understood by Alan of Lille and the poets 
who descend from him, the being and the name of “Nature” also 
implicates the history of human responsibility towards the being of 
all things, in nature’s continuing requirement about responsibility.140 
 
Simply put, whether found in Alan’s vision, the stories of indigenous 
peoples, or in centuries of philosophical and spiritual wittings, there is the 
ability for tenderness in us toward the most vulnerable animals among us.  
Whether or not tied to the non-practice of virtutes, many modern cultures 
have turned away from this aspect of our being, having created a social 
norm where love and compassion are attributes that we habitually claim, 
but mostly fail to practice.  Again, as Paul Shepard tells us, from a 
standpoint of human evolution (both biological and, relatedly, culturally), 
many humans today are simply deprived from becoming the mature 
individuals we should be in order to “handle our responsibilities to things 
wild.”141  Of course, given our ties to life on this planet, both through 
genetics, and more recently a shared history, “there is a secret person 
undamaged in each of us.”142  If we could once again properly nourish that 
secret soul, perhaps we can then re-communion with other life on Earth. 
Thus, a right of ethical consideration is an approach for us to again 
become conscious of the undeniable connection between us and all living 
things.  It requires us to not only ask what it means for other animals to live 
a meaningful life, but also for us to offer up for examination how our 
proposed, future decisions might impact those lives.  Time and time again, 
those who have seriously examined these questions objectively, and with 
an open heart, have come to similar conclusions, namely, that our 
“assumption of separation and even superiority is just that.”143  But it’s not 
enough to have an occasional thinker reach such a moral position.  We need 
a broader effort to create the collective human will to turn an intangible 
moral conviction into an operable code that requires animals be given the 
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appropriate level of respect and dignity in our societal decision-making 
processes. 
Unfortunately, left unaided, it has proven very difficult for us to 
establish such an ethic, let alone regain that instinctive connection to the 
natural world.  We have established hardened institutional lines—religious, 
economic, cultural, and legal—between the human and other world.  Those 
who benefit from the status quo will certainly do their best to discourage 
any attempt to rekindle our moral connections, and responsibility, to non-
human animals and the environment.  But the truth is the more we learn 
about those connections, and about the lives of others, the more we tend to 
see that those institutional lines are barriers to a better world for all of us.  
In other words, the more we can engage in methodical, shared ethical 
consideration of other animals, the more likely we will be to change our 
harmful behavior towards others and perhaps someday even grant specific, 
yet appropriate, rights to non-human animals. 
In my mind, such an effort requires collaboration of three disciplines, 
philosophy (and in particular the Capabilities Approach), science, and law 
to help us determine, perhaps on a case-by-case base, what an animal needs 
to live a meaningful life.  Each of these disciplines offers an important 
foundation for a right of ethical consideration, all of which are necessary to 
change our social attitudes toward non-human animals.  Let us consider the 
significance of each.  
 
B.The First Tier of a Right of Ethical Consideration: Philosophical 
Conviction. 
 
Perhaps the work of the Philadelphia Quaker William Bartram, one of 
America’s most influential naturalists of the late eighteenth and early 
nineteenth centuries, best illustrates the importance of philosophy for a 
modern right of ethical consideration.  Bartram proposes that human 
behavior points to the existence of a faculty of reason, and that one function 
of reason is moral awareness.144  He further offers us the following, “what 
is ethically appropriate for one rational agent is appropriate for all rational 
agents.”145  In other words, humans have an obligation “to promote the 
flourishing of other” in our moral community, which would include all 
sentient actors, human and non-human alike.146  Humans, of course, are (so 
far) the only mega-rational animal capable of making moral choices 
regarding the lives of other living things. 
 
144. See Kerry S. Walters, The “Peaceable Disposition” of Animals: William 









This supposition is again echoed nearly a century and half later in the 
works of semioethicists, like John Deely and Morten Tønnessen.  Here the 
belief is that all living things are semiosic.147  That is, all living things 
contribute meaningfully to dynamic systems of signification within their 
environments.148  Deely has in particular emphasized a distinction between 
those living beings with moral standing in their environment, and the 
uniquely human domain of moral agents (capable of moral evaluation).  
What matters then are ethical obligations. In his words, “[h]uman animals 
not only are unique in having responsibilities, but also in the extent of those 
responsibilities: for we have learned through and on the basis of semiosis 
become ‘metasemiosis’ or semiotics that our interactions involve us in the 
whole of Gaia, not just the human socio-cultural sphere.”149Accordingly, 
for Deely, “semioethics . . . springs from the discovery that the human 
being has responsibility that goes beyond the human world.”150 
Of course, the question remains, with respect to the non-human animal 
world, or what Bartram would call brute creation, as to whether other 
animals are actually similarly endowed with rationality, and, thus, entitled 
to “the same right of ethical consideration as other members of the moral 
community?”151  Semioethicists could certainly make the case that 
participation by a living thing in a system of signs alone demonstrates, as 
suggested by John Locke, a life of reason and logic (rationality).152  Or, 
from Bartram’s perspective, we can appeal to “those actions and 
movements of animals which they have in common with us.”153  Finding 
little difference between such actions, “why, then, have we not every reason 
to believe that those actions and movements are excited and proceed from 
the same [rational] motives or cause?”154 
Thus, on one hand, even without scientific inquiry, animals appear to 
“behave in purposeful, creative ways,” and are capable of activities 
displaying utility, beauty and orderliness.155  In line with Nussbaum’s view 
of the Capabilities Approach, while each species might have a unique set 
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of capabilities, animals, when examined, demonstrate certain functions 
that, when allowed to be exercised, contribute to their well-being (and 
presumably a happier life).  After centuries of debate, today we can assert 
with philosophical conviction that non-human animals possess such 
capabilities, and that they therefore deserve some level of ethical 
consideration.  I do believe, however, that philosophy alone does not 
compel a basic right of ethical consideration.  But it does establish a moral 
basis requiring us to make a scientific inquiry into what animals need to 
live meaningful lives, and how human actions facilitate or impede the 
capabilities of others.  So, let us look at the second tier, scientific 
imagination. 
 
C. The Second Tier of a Right of Ethical Consideration: Scientific 
Imagination. 
 
Today, it would be almost unimaginable for the family doctor, when 
asked to consider our overall health and well-being, to simply poke and 
prod us physically, while completely ignoring our emotional and mental 
health.  We are holistic beings—physical ailments can affect our mental 
fitness and mental stressors can make us physically ill.156  Yet, less than a 
century ago, from a medical profession standpoint, this was not the norm.  
Many medical doctors were, by in large, only interested in examining and 
treating the physical manifestations of our well-being.  Can the problem be 
diagnosed and treated through physical examination?  Can it be cut out of 
us or treated with medication?  These questions were within the province 
of the doctor.  The problems of the head and heart—mental and emotional 
well-being—were left for the “softer-side” of science, like psychology.157  
We are currently emerging from a similar age of denialism in animal 
science.  For the longest time, science has depicted animals as “stimulus-
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response machines while declaring their inner lives barren.”158  As James 
C. Ha and Tracy L. Campion, recently described it: 
 
In the not so distant past, the idea that animals were capable 
of feeling “emotions” was unorthodox, at best, and blasphemous, 
at worst, and ethologists have long struggled with conflicting 
schools of thought.  While Darwin was one of the first scientists to 
write about the emotional lives of nonhuman animals, most early 
scientists and philosophers (and philosopher-scientists) were 
animal emotion denialists, and none of them more so than Rene 
Descartes.  Descartes postulated that animals were “automata,” 
beings that behaved in ways that gave the false appearance of 
emotion and consciousness, but who were, in fact, merely 
mechanistic.  But in the centuries since the “dark ages” of animal 
science, new hypotheses have been presented, suggesting that 
there’s not only ample scientific evidence of emotion in animals 
that are seen as “complex” and “charismatic,” such as dolphins, 
nonhuman apes, elephants, and dogs, but even among insects, who 
have some of the most simplistic neural circuitry.159 
 
Thus, for a large part of the two centuries, animal sciences were rooted 
in biology.  This was true even for ethology, the study of animal behavior, 
which long considered animal behavior to be an evolutionarily adaptive 
trait.160  At best, psychologists believed such behavior could be influenced 
by associative learning, but there was certainly no such thing as animal 
cognition and emotion.161  
Today, however, this is changing.  While we cannot be 100% sure 
what human or non-human animals actually feel, the “weight of the 
evidence from evolutionary biology and large bodies of detailed 
comparative evidence, together with grounded common sense, all indicate 
with high probability that animals with nervous systems are indeed sentient, 
meaning that they feel.”162  Of course, this is also what philosophers were 
 
158. Frans de Waal, Your Dog Feels as Guilty as She Looks, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 
2019), https://perma.cc/TM9K-HLDD. 
159. See generally James C. Ha & Tracy L. Campion, The Emotional Animal: Using 
the Science Of Emotions to Interpret Behavior, DOG BEHAVIOR (Academic Press 2019). 
160. Definition of ethology, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://perma.cc/S5LL-BSVL (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2020). 
161. Leviton, supra note 17, at 7; Wall, supra note 158, at 7 (Indeed, as Frans de 
Wall explains, “It wasn’t until the 1990s that we finally started to win the battle with the 
behaviorists, and those that talked about animal cognition got a foothold and got funding for 
experiments”). 
162. Marc Bekoff & Jessica Pierce, Animal welfare cannot adequately protect 
nonhuman animals: The need for a science of animal well-being, 1 ANIMAL SENTIENCE 7(2) 
(2016). 
 




telling us long ago, what Darwin seemed to believe163 and what Bartram 
concluded through his own powers of observation.164  In short, other 
animals display emotions, invent, act purposefully, teach, learn, and adapt. 
 What is currently happening is what Dr. Marc Bekoff calls 
“naturalizing the study of animal emotions.”165  Bekoff and his colleague 
Jessica Pierce call this emerging scientific change “compassionate 
conservation.”166 
Scientific research that helps us understand the lives of wild animals 
is vitally important, as are the intentional conservation efforts to protect 
them.  The science of animal well-being challenges us to explore ways in 
which we can be less selfish and violent in our relationships with animals.  
It focuses attention on individual animals themselves and what they need 
and want, not just what we need and want.  It seeks first and foremost to 
avoid harming animals, and encourages creative thinking about how to 
protect the integrity and freedom of animals.167 
Compassionate conservation proposes that conservation ethics should 
consider animals as individuals, not just members of populations of 
species.168  It means using empathy for non-human animals and striving to 
reduce the harm we humans can cause to them.169  But the real gift 
compassionate conservationism gives us is the license for science to be 
more imaginative.  Researchers are rapidly gathering ample evidence, and 
new data is constantly accumulating, to support arguments that many, if not 
all, animals have deep, rich, and complex emotional lives.170  One only 
needs to tune into both the popular media and scientific news outlets to see 
these advancements in the headlines on a near weekly basis.171  For those 
who pay attention, the discoveries are truly startling.  It is not just the 
elephants, whales, dolphins and apes of our world that make news about 
their cognitive, social and emotional lives.  The list also includes all types 
of birds, mammals, insects, and fish species.  Perhaps most importantly, 
with the door open to the study of the meaningful lives of animals, the field 
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of study is expanding to include more traditional, “hard” sciences, like 
neurobiology.172 
Today we live in a world where animal science is no longer bound 
exclusively to the principles of physiology.  Scientists are instead 
encouraged to “pay closer attention to anecdotes along with empirical data 
and philosophical arguments as heuristics for future research.”173  We can 
combine the “hard” and “soft” interdisciplinary research necessary to 
advance the study of animal emotions.  This gives us the opportunity to 
begin engaging in the inquiry set forth by Nussbaum,174 and begin forming 
a set of species-specific capabilities.  Perhaps this coupling of philosophical 
thought and scientific knowledge can then form the basis for reforming our 
legal system to better ensure ethical consideration (and perhaps justice) for 
non-human animals.  Let us then turn to the final tier—our system of laws 
and justice. 
 
D. The Third Tier of a Right of Ethical Consideration: Legal Ingenuity 
 
1. Can the Existing Legal Framework be Used to Advance a Right of 
Ethical Consideration for Non-human Animals? 
 
Unlike modern philosophical and scientific thinking regarding animal 
sentience, the law, as it pertains to animals, remains a relic of the 
unenlightened thinking of the past.  We have already seen that our animal 
welfare laws apply only to a handful of captive animals, and even then, 
really only seek to minimize physical, and not mental, suffering.175  For 
wild animals, the law continues to regard them merely as biological units. 
Take the Endangered Species Act, for instance, widely considered the jewel 
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of all wildlife law.176  The statute itself does not even once use the word 
“animal,” instead setting forth broad principles of species and habitat 
conservation to ensure “viable” populations.177  Not a single federal wildlife 
statute expressly provides any protection for the social structures, or 
emotional well-being of any wild animal.178  This is despite the obvious fact 
that a viable animal population—one that has the minimum conditions 
necessary for survival and reproduction—does not in turn mean a happy 
population, where each animal is able to function within its capabilities.  
There are, however, a number of statutes that might serve as an initial 
point for a new right of ethical consideration.  These statutes can be referred 
to as informational in nature.  Some of these laws require that the 
government disseminate and consider relevant information about the 
impacts of human activity on the natural world, like the National 
Environmental Policy Act.179  Others require that information distributed 
for commercial purposes be truthful, or at least not intentionally 
misleading, like false claim acts and consumer right-to-know statutes.180  
Another possible example is cost benefit analysis, which by presidential 
order has applied for decades to a vast majority of regulations and projects 
proposed by the federal government.181  Such analysis is a formal technique 
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for comparatively assessing the costs and benefits of an activity or project 
over a relevant time period.182  To date, these laws have not been tested 
appropriately as vehicles to examine how human action affects the social, 
cultural, emotional, and other capabilities of animals.  
Now, the dissemination of truthful information is itself not a 
substantive protection.  Broader knowledge about how our actions 
specifically affect the meaningful lives of other animals is not going to 
make life better for the creatures we harm.  But the proper use of 
information in public decision-making processes can lay the foundation for 
change.  The purpose for these information-based laws in the first place is 
not solely to ensure accurate information, but “a decision-making 
procedure which emphasizes the process of free and fair deliberation 
among individuals where their preferences and value orientations are 
debated with a focus on the need to realize the common good.”183  Likewise, 
requiring accurate information be distributed in public spheres—political 
and economic—is a means to ensure that individual actors are inclined to 
make more ethical or reasonable judgments when given the opportunity in 
a public sphere to reflect about the whole environment as a common good.  
This is particularly true when the public forum allows others to challenge 
their potentially narrow, self-interested viewpoints.184  Finally, we know 
from experience that as information is disseminated and the impacts of 
human action on a particular group become increasingly indisputable, our 
laws often change to provide new substantive protections. 
 
2. Practical Application and Goals of a Legal Right of Ethical 
Consideration for Non-human Animals. 
 
So, at this point it is probably clear where this is heading.  The idea of 
a right of ethical consideration is to utilize existing informational laws to 
assemble a larger audience for the philosophical and scientific arguments 
that human actions can and do have the ability to impact the lives of non-
human animals.  Of course, it is hoped that along the way careful 
consideration of particular evidence will result in the avoidance of some 
human activities that could diminish an animal’s (or animals’) quality of 
life.  But the longer view is that an accumulation of information, even if 
initially disputed, will transform into a larger societal will that extends legal 
protections and rights to non-human animals. 
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Using Figure 1 above, let’s consider the following set of facts to 
examine how a legal right of ethical consideration might use existing 
informational laws to address current scientific evidence that a particular 
species, in this case, elephants, have individual capabilities that are 
impacted by captivity. 
In 2016, three U.S. zoos—the Dallas Zoo, the Sedwick County Zoo in 
Wichita, and Omaha’s Henry Doorly Zoo—sought to import up to eighteen 
elephants captured from the wild in the Kingdom of Eswatini (formerly 
Swaziland).185  The zoos called this proposed import “a rescue mission.”186  
According to the zoos and the Eswatini Big Game Parks authority, the 
estimated elephant population of thirty-nine elephants in the nation 
exceeded the parks’ carrying capacity.187  The Eswatini authorities claimed 
that the elephants had destroyed the vegetation in their compounds, and that 
it was negatively affecting other species.188  As such, they asserted that the 
only options to address the elephant population were to make arrangements 
for them to be sent to U.S. zoos or to cull them.189 
 
185. See Siebert, supra note 12, at 30–31. 
186. Id.  
187. See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction at 8, Friends of Animals v. Ashe, No. CV 16-216 (JDB), 2016 WL 
10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8–1. 
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In the process of obtaining necessary permits from the U.S. Fish & 
Wildlife Service for these imports, the overwhelming view of scientists that 
commented on the proposal was that when elephants are confined, they 
nearly always endure severe physical and physiological hardship, 
especially when they have spent their entire lives in the wild.190  As sentient 
animals reliant on family bonds, elephants in zoos display behavioral 
abnormalities and suffer from increased disease or disability caused by 
captive environments.  Dr. Joyce Poole, a distinguished expert on elephant 
social behavior and communication, explains it this way: 
 
[Elephants have] renowned memories, intelligence, and 
sociality of elephants have been documented repeatedly.  Similar 
to those of humans, these traits also make elephants particularly 
vulnerable to stress and trauma and their long-term consequences.  
These effects of the proposed importation would have long lasting 
impacts both for the animals removed from their families and for 
those remaining.  The capture and removal of elephants from their 
habitats, families and extended social groups is unethical and 
cruel.191 
In other words, elephants are one species that we can easily determine, 
from both a philosophical basis and a scientific one, have species-specific 
capabilities.  
How do we make a case for a right of ethical consideration for these 
animals?  First, let us consider the use of NEPA or even cost benefit 
analysis to inject the scientific evidence into the permitting process.  The 
questions to be asked are: (1) Is there valid scientific information available 
to FWS that would be relevant as to whether any or all of these eighteen 
elephants might suffer psychological, behavioral, and physical impacts 
associated with captivity?; (2) If so, does FWS have a legal obligation to 
adequately consider such information in complying with NEPA?; and (3) 
with this information adequately considered, does it alter the way we look 
at the transfer given the costs likely to be born by the elephants?   
The answer to the first question is painfully clear: elephants are one of 
the few species in which the scientific evidence is not only overwhelming, 
 
190. See, e.g., Declaration of Dr. Marion Elizabeth Garaï in Support of Motion for a 
Preliminary Injunction, Friends of Animals v. Ashe, No. CV 16-216 (JDB), 2016 WL 
10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8-4; Declaration of Dr. Phyllis Lee in Support of 
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF 8-3), Friends of Animals v. Ashe, No. CV 16-216 
(JDB), 2016 WL 10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8-3; Declaration of Dr. Joyce 
Poole in Support of Motion for a Preliminary Injunction (ECF 8-2), Friends of Animals v. 
Ashe, No. CV 16-216 (JDB), 2016 WL 10732198 (D.D.C. Feb. 2, 2016), ECF No. 8-2. 
191. Poole Declaration, supra note 190, at ¶13. 
 




but also uncontested.192  With regard to the second question, there is ample 
precedent that NEPA requires disclosure and consideration of this 
information, even though agencies have largely failed to do so in cases like 
this one.193  This includes scientific evidence that indicates a proposed 
federal action might injure an animal, whether causing stress to the animals, 
harassing its social structure, or otherwise causing mental harassment.194  
The third question is more elusive, because it depends heavily on the level 
of compassion and concern an individual decisionmaker (or any individual 
asked to consider the question) may have toward elephants and other non-
human animals.  The real test is whether the addition of this new 
information has the potential to alter our judgments and beliefs about the 
ethics of the proposed transfer.  Certainly, it might not immediately change 
the regulatory disposition of the permit.  Even so, it seems hard to believe 
that this exercise—this right of ethical consideration afforded the 
elephants—lacks potential to raise very strong compassion for these 
animals that might not otherwise have existed.  Compassion not only in the 
decisionmakers, but the public and others who have the power to alter 
decisions and legal structures to prevent future human-caused incursions 
into the lives of elephants.  
A second possible use of existing law and science might be the use of 
consumer protection acts or other laws prohibiting the dissemination of 
false information about a good, service, or public benefit.  Although 
certainly more controversial, there are many who would assert the zoos, 
both individually and collectively, not only suppress the relevant scientific 
evidence regarding the impact of captivity on some animals’ social, 
 
192. See Marion Garai, Statement re the proposed sale and transfer of 18 elephants 
from Swaziland to three Zoos in the USA, CONSERVATION ACTION TRUST (Nov. 20, 2015), 
https://perma.cc/6EHV-WZLE. 
193. See Recent Past Pres. Network v. Latschar, 701 F. Supp. 2d 49, 55 (D.D.C. 
2010) (a court must consider whether “the agency has made an adequate compilation of 
relevant information, has analyzed it reasonably, has not ignored pertinent data, and has 
made public disclosures”). 
194. See, e.g., Greenpeace U.S.A. v. Evans, 688 F. Supp. 579, 582–83 (W.D. Wash 
1987) (requiring consideration of the government’s own concern that a proposed research 
project could result in “harassment on the [killer] whales’ social structure”); WildEarth 
Guardian v. Mont. Snowmobile Ass’n, 790 F.3d 920, 923, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2015)( 
analyzing an agency decision that acknowledged that snowmobile use in the forest can 
“stress animals and provoke a flight response during the winter season, when the animals 
are particularly vulnerable to depletion of their energy reserves” and finding the agency had 
not adequately addressed the possible harassment on certain “big game” species); In Def. of 
Animals v. United States DOI, 751 F.3d 1054, 1069 (9th Cir. 2014) (reviewing an EA 
addressing the use of helicopter roundups of wild horses on public lands that described the 
actions the agency would undertake so the process “would not unnecessarily stress the 
animals”); NRDC v. Winter, 645 F. Supp. 2d 841, 849-51 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (finding that 
NEPA requires analysis of the effects of sonar to determine the sound level thresholds for 
“harassment and injury” of whales). 
 




emotional and mental well-being, but actually work to convince the public 
(and consumer) that the work they are doing is beneficial to the animal and 
its species.195  Such acts might be considered a “deceptive commercial 
practice.”  For instance in Kansas, where one of the three zoos is located, 
the law defines such a practice as “the knowing act, use or employment by 
any person of any deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, or 
misrepresentation of a material fact, with the intent that others shall rely 
thereon in connection with the sale of any merchandise.”196  Such acts 
certainly include false and misleading statements about animals that are 
being used for a commercial purpose.197 
Of course, a right of ethical consideration is not intended to be a tool 
to prosecute and punish cruel acts against animals.  It ultimately seeks to 
make tangible changes to legal status of animals to provide adequate 
protections to their social, emotional, and mental well-being based on the 
scientific evidence of their species-specific capabilities.  Returning to 
Figure 1, what we are considering so far is merely the recognition of, and 
some basic level of respect for, elephants’ capabilities in the process that 
went into deciding to steal them away from their wild African homes.  
Ultimately, of course, the goal is to support the expanding amount of 
scientific knowledge about their capabilities with new procedural and 
substantive rights.  A starting point would be enactment of a more specific 
set of informational-based laws that require consideration of an animal’s 
physical and mental well-being.  This would be something necessary at the 
federal, state and even local levels to ensure animals receive the broadest 
consideration.  It would also eliminate some of the problems some will see 
in using existing informational laws to advance a new right of ethical 
consideration. 
A second step would likely be enactment or recognition of legal 
standing for animals to assert their own claim to a right of ethical 
consideration in a legal proceeding (or the granting of a guardian ad litem 
to do so on their behalf).198  From a substantive rights standpoint, as 
discussed further in the next section, such rights need to be appropriate to 
the species in consideration and their capabilities.  What is intended are 
minimum rights that would allow the species to fulfill its capabilities and 
live a meaningful life with little or no interference from humans.  
Elephants of course might be the easy case for a right of ethical 
consideration.  But as science illuminates the capabilities of other species, 
they too deserve the same consideration, and ultimately rights.  As 
 
195. See Seibert, supra note 12, at 29–30. 
196. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-6503(a) (2012). 
197. See, e.g., Finstad v. Washburn University of Topeka, 845 P.2d 685, 690 (Kan. 
1993). 
198. See, e.g., Cass Sunstein, Standing for Animals (With Notes on Animal Rights), 
47 UCLA L. REV. 1333, 1365 (2000). 
 




illustrated in Figure 1, perhaps the loftiest goal of a right of ethical 
consideration is some universal understanding that all species have their 
own unique capabilities, and we should seek to minimize our impact on 
them even where the science is not yet robust.  Ultimately, perhaps, all non-
human animals should have the right to simply be left alone, which may be 
considered the hallmark of right to liberty that humans seek.199 
Finally, the right of ethical consideration I seek is not completely 
hypothetical.  As Martha C. Nussbaum has pointed out, “there is a happy 
harbinger of what may be a new era in law, in the form of a remarkable 
2016 opinion.”  In that case, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the U.S. Navy 
violated the law in seeking to continue a sonar program that impacted the 
behavior of whales.200  While the decision is largely “a technical exercise 
in statutory interpretation of the Marine Mammal Protection Act,” what 
Nussbaum finds “significant, and fascinating, is that the argument relies 
heavily on a consideration of whale capabilities that the program 
disrupts:”201  
 
Effects from exposures below 180 dB can cause short-term 
disruption of abandonment of natural behavior patterns.  These 
behavioral disruptions can cause affected marine mammals to 
stop communicating with each other, to flee or avoid an 
ensonified area, to cease foraging for food, to separate from their 
calves, and to interrupt mating.  LFA sonar can also cause 
heightened stress responses from marine mammals.  Such 
behavioral disruptions can force marine mammals to make trade-
offs like delaying migration, delaying reproduction, reducing 
growth, or migrating with reduced energy reserves.202  
 
Thus, according to Nussbaum, the court “recognize[s] whales as 
beings with a complex and active form of life that includes emotional well-
being, affiliation, and free movement: in short, a variety of species-specific 
 
199. See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, Constitutional Perspectives: Article: The First 
Duty Of Government: Protection, Liberty And The Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 
507, 517 n.52 (1991)(“A positive right or liberty is a right to act in a particular way, or to 
receive or possess a particular thing, whereas a negative right or liberty is a right to be free 
from interference or coercion); see also 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
LAWS OF ENGLAND 124 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803 & photo. reprint 1969) ([T]he 
principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, 
which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature, but which could not be 
preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse which is gained by the 
institution of friendly and social communities”). 
200. See id. at 1142; see generally JOSHUA HORWITZ, WAR OF THE WHALES: A TRUE 
STORY (2015) (describing the sonar program in detail). 
201. Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 625. 
202. Id. at 625 (quoting Pritzker, 828 F.3d at 1130–31). 
 




forms of agency.  The opinion goes well beyond Bentham, and it also 
eschews the anthropocentric approach.”203 
Let’s hope she is right, and this slender decision is “a new era in the 
law of animal welfare.”204 
 
IV. Critical Review: How Does a Legal Right of Ethical 
Consideration for Non-human Animals Compare to Other Animal 
Rights’ Theories? 
 
No proposal to advance the rights of non-human animals will go 
uncritiqued.  While I do not feel it necessary to respond to the blanket 
challenges out there regarding expanding our universe of rights to 
animals,205 I do believe it is fair to address whether a right of ethical 
consideration addresses some of the common problems with other 
proposals, like personhood.206  The answer is that I think it does, and quite 
decisively. 
For example, with respect to the utilitarian argument that for an animal 
to be given rights in our legal system, he or she must be able to “bear legal 
duties” or be “legally accountable for [his or her] actions.”  The capabilities 
approach shows us that this not the appropriate standard for granting basic 
rights, whether to humans or non-humans.  A child or incapacitated person 
might not be able to meet these requirements at any given time, but their 
entitlement to live a meaningful life free of intrusion is not lessened.  Even 
the most incapacitated of us deserve to have our right to happiness, bodily 
integrity, freedom of movement, etc. protected by the law. 
Of course, this brings us back to the concept of “appropriate” rights.  
This is also one area Wise’s theory of personhood suffered when examined.  
But look, no one would argue that a 5-year-old child be granted the same 
rights and freedoms of an 18-year-old adult.  Nor would we argue that a 
person suffering a mental incapacitation be allowed to exercise, at least 
without guardianship, certain basic economic and legal decision-making.  
Similarly, no one is arguing that animals be granted all the legal rights 
afforded humans.  That is contrary to the belief that capacities are species-
specific.  The law needs to take into consideration how best to protect those 
species-specific capabilities.  Perhaps for starter, we need laws prohibiting 
placing any wild elephant, whale or dolphin into captivity.  As of this 
moment, we do not know how our actions impact the capacities of every 
animal on earth.  Clearly some animals, like dogs and cats, thrive in our 
company.  Others we know don’t, and still for many others science is still 
 
203.  Nussbaum, supra note 30, at 625. 
 204.      Id. 
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is ‘seriously flawed’, BBC NEWS (May 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/8LVA-MTM7.  
206. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 




considering the question.  That is the point of a right of ethical 
consideration—it provides an opportunity for non-human animals to have 
their needs considered by us, and then if necessary, protected by 
appropriate rights. 
Finally, for the same reason, a right of ethical consideration also 
addresses the problem of setting usable precedent for advancing the legal 
rights of animals that might not meet the current tests of intelligence or 
autonomy based upon our current scientific understanding.  First off, it does 
not rely upon these types of human characteristics to judge the rights of 
non-human animals.  Instead, it recognizes that every species has unique 
capabilities, that may or may not be anything we experience.  A right of 
ethical consideration provides a pathway to discover, over time, what these 
species-specific capabilities are, and to determine how we might protect 
them from human interference.  In this regard, I reject the criticism levied 
on past approaches of animal rights regarding incrementalism.207  While it 
is true that a right of ethical consideration may not protect the lives of every 
animal from the start, is that what animal right advocates really want?  Or 
do we want a system that uses comprehensive tiers of thought to provide 
the right protections for each species, so that in the long-term all life on 




As I sat here contemplating how best to end this discussion, I found 
myself watching the 92nd Academy Awards.  While deeply distracted by 
the right of ethical consideration (and all the criticism it may receive), I am 
interrupted by the awarding of the best actor award to Joaquin Phoenix for 
his role in the Joker, and of course, his passionate acceptance of the award 
on behalf of all animals: 
I’m full of so much gratitude now.  I do not feel elevated 
above any of my fellow nominees or anyone in this room, because 
we share the same love – that’s the love of film.  And this form of 
expression has given me the most extraordinary life.  I don’t know 
where I’d be without it.  But I think the greatest gift that it’s given 
me, and many people in [this industry] is the opportunity to use 
our voice for the voiceless.  I’ve been thinking about some of the 
distressing issues that we’ve been facing collectively. 
I think at times we feel or are made to feel that we champion 
different causes.  But for me, I see commonality.  I think, whether 
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we’re talking about gender inequality or racism or queer rights or 
indigenous rights or animal rights, we’re talking about the fight 
against injustice.  We’re talking about the fight against the belief 
that one nation, one people, one race, one gender, one species, has 
the right to dominate, use and control another with impunity.  
I think we’ve become very disconnected from the natural 
world.  Many of us are guilty of an egocentric world view, and we 
believe that we’re the center of the universe.  We go into the 
natural world and we plunder it for its resources.  We feel entitled 
to artificially inseminate a cow and steal her baby, even though 
her cries of anguish are unmistakable.  Then we take her milk 
that’s intended for her calf and we put it in our coffee and our 
cereal. 
We fear the idea of personal change, because we think we 
need to sacrifice something; to give something up.  But human 
beings at our best are so creative and inventive, and we can create, 
develop and implement systems of change that are beneficial to 
all sentient beings and the environment. 
I have been a scoundrel all my life, I’ve been selfish.  I’ve 
been cruel at times, hard to work with, and I’m grateful that so 
many of you in this room have given me a second chance.  I think 
that’s when we’re at our best: when we support each other.  Not 
when we cancel each other out for our past mistakes, but when we 
help each other to grow.  When we educate each other; when we 
guide each other to redemption. 
When he was 17, my brother [River] wrote this lyric.  He 
said: “run to the rescue with love and peace will follow.209 
 
You can imagine my excitement hearing these words at that exact 
time.  Perhaps my ideas were not so extreme after all was my first thought.  
Quickly, it settled into my mind that this should not just be another 
profound assertion of our disconnect with the natural world and treatment 
of non-human animals.  Too many similar thoughts have been uttered over 
the centuries.  It is time to undertake a change in how we consider our 
impact on other species.  Perhaps to build upon Martha C. Nussbaum’s 
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